Leo Spitz Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Director, The Comparative Constitutions Project
Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2014) (with Alberto Simpser).
Law and Development in Middle Income Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2014) (with Randall Peerenboom).
Comparative Constitutional Law in Asia (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) (with Rosalind Dixon).
Public Law in Asia (Ashgate publishing, Library of Essays on Law in Asia, 2013 (with Albert H.Y. Chen).
International Commercial arbitration in Asia (Juris Publishing, 2002; 2nd ed. 2005; 3rd ed. 2013) (with Philip J. McConnaughay and Shahla Ali).
The Japanese Legal System: An Era of Transition (Robbins Collection, 2013) (with Harry Scheiber).
Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) (with Rosalind Dixon).
Administrative Law and Governance in Asia: Comparative Perspectives (Routledge Press, 2009) (with Albert Chen).
Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2008) (with Tamir Moustafa).
Institutions and Public Law: Comparative Approaches (Peter Lang Publishing, 2005) (with Robert A. Kagan).
Legal Reform in Korea (Routledge Publishing, 2004).
The Multiple Worlds of Japanese Law (University of Victoria Center for Asia Pacific Initiatives, 2001) (with Luke Nottage and Hiroo Sono).
Seeds of Peace, by Sulak Sivaraksa (1992).
Cambridge University Press, 2009
(with Zachary Elkins and James Melton).
“This book had the same effect on me as reading Goran Therborn’s 1977 New Left Review paper on the history and origins of Democracy. I found it hard to put down and impossible to stop thinking about. It is an agenda setting work which will hugely influence comparative politics.” - James Robinson, Professor of Government, Harvard University
Cambridge University Press, 2003
"Ginsburg provides compelling empirical support in his three East Asian cases that judicial power increases when political power is diffuse. Because he is interested in highlihgting the conditions under which courts can constrain other political actors, compliance is an important indicator of judicial independence." - Shannon Roesler, Law and Social Inquiry